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I. Introduction
Complex-litigation legislation, specifically legislation affecting
mass-tort litigation, has been lurking about the House Judiciary
Committee in one form or another for more than a decade. In the
late 1970s, Congressman George E. Danielson (D-California),
sponsored a bill that would have created federal-question jurisdiction over airplane-crash litigation.' Thereafter, in four consecutive
Congresses in the 1980s, Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier
(D-Wisconsin), introduced legislation that would have expanded
diversity jurisdiction in mass-tort cases, thereby facilitating the
consolidation of such cases in the federal courts.2 Early incarnations of the Kastenmeier legislation would have conferred this special jurisdiction over a wide range of mass torts. The 1983 and
1986 variations of the bill, for example, proposed to extend diversity jurisdiction to all cases "arising out of a single event, transaction, occurrence, or course of conduct" that resulted in injury to
twenty-five or more people.3 These early versions of the legislation would have reached not only mass accidents, but toxic exposures, product defects, and other mass torts as well; subsequent
legislative versions, however, were limited to mass accidents, such
as airplane crashes and hotel fires.' Because the Kastenmeier
mass-accident bill was the only complex-litigation proposal active
in the 101st Congress, this Article will focus on it.
Congressman Kastenmeier's mass-accident bill represented his
subcommittee's best efforts to achieve consensus and compromise
I. H.R. 231, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
2. H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983); H.R. 4315, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986);
H.R. 3152, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); H.R.
3406, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989).
3. H.R. 3690, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 4315, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
The 1987 legislation was even broader, applying to cases "arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of related transactions or occurrences," which were alleged
in good faith to have resulted in injury to 25 or more people. H.R. 3152 § 401(a), 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
4. H.R. 4807 § 301, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Court Reform and Access to
Justice Act: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 3152, 100th
Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 624 (1988) [hereinafter CRAJ Act: Hearings]. Compare H.R.
RE,. No. 515, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) (to eliminate any doubt that the reform
was to apply only to mass accidents, the House Judiciary Committee revised the bill to
reach actions arising "from a single accident, where at least 25 natural persons have either
died or incurred injury in the accident at a discrete location").
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among diverse and divergent interests. At least three factors justify his preference for proceeding by compromise and consensus
in processing the mass-torts legislation. First, the benefits derived
from sound mass-torts legislation tend to be systemic in nature.
Because the potential gains from this type of legislation are diffused system wide, no one group may have a stake in the legislation that is sufficient to justify an active campaign in support of
the bill. Conversely, the perceived costs of mass-torts legislation
may not be as evenly dispersed; isolated groups may regard a
mass-torts proposal as disproportionately burdensome. For such
groups, there is ample incentive to wage an active campaign
against the bill. Without compromise to neutralize this opposition,
and without energetic sources of support to counterbalance it, representatives may receive only negative constituent correspondence
on the legislation, making them reluctant to act upon it favorably.
Second, legislation on which a consensus exists can be
processed without risk of amendment on the floor of the House.
In the House, bills may be scheduled on the "Suspension Calendar," which suspends many of the rules of the House-most notably, the rules permitting floor amendments. The net effect is that
a bill on the Suspension Calendar is presented to the House members as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Because bills taken up
under a suspension of the rules must receive two-thirds majority
support, the Suspension Calendar is an inappropriate vehicle for
passing partisan or otherwise controversial legislation. The Suspension Calendar is an attractive vehicle, however, for processing
complex, noncontroversial legislative proposals; it ensures that the
statutory text, which has been carefully developed by a Congressional Committee with expertise on the subject matter of the legislation, is not amended on the House floor at the urging of
well-meaning legislators who may lack such expertise.
Third, when the subject matter is complicated, dull, and lowprofile, as is often the case with complex-litigation reform,
proceeding by consensus and compromise may be the only reasonable alternative to not proceeding at all. As near and dear as issues in complex litigation are to the writers and readers of the
articles collected in this symposium, they can be incomprehensible
and dreary for the average member of Congress. Even representatives assigned to Committees with jurisdiction over complexlitigation reform may have insufficient time and interest to become
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thoroughly acquainted with matters as arcane and difficult as minimal diversity, multifactor choice-of-law analysis, and reverse
removal. If consensus or compromise cannot be reached among
the interested parties who do have the requisite knowledge and expertise, Congress, which does not, may be ill-equipped to arbitrate
their differences. As long as complex-litigation reform maintains
a low political profile, and pressure to pass legislation of some
sort is therefore limited, the most likely outcome-in the absence
of a consensus as to how best to proceed-will be in a decision
not to move forward, for want of time, interest, and expertise.
The remainder of this Article will describe the forces that
helped to shape the Kastenmeier mass-accident bill and explain
why, despite achieving general consensus, the bill did not become
law.
II. The Development of H.R. 3406: Achieving Compromise and
Consensus Among the Participants in the Legislative Process
A single issue dominated debate on the bill: To what class
or classes of mass tort should the consolidation mechanism created
by the bill apply? Mass accidents alone? Toxic exposures?
Product defects? Other important issues were raised and considered relating to choice of law, punitive damages, the jurisdictional basis for consolidation, and the threshold number of victims,
but were, for all except perhaps the academic community, secondary in their relative significance.5
Outside participants in the development of the Kastenmeier
legislation fell into one of three groups: (1) public-sector participants, (2) private-sector participants, and (3) academic or
scholarly participants.
A. Public-Sector Participants
Public-sector participants in the development of the Kastenmeier legislation included the federal judiciary and the federal executive, and to a lesser extent, state judges and state legislators.
5. See Kastenmeier & Geyh, The Case in Support of Legislation Facilitating the
Consolidation of Mass-Accident Legislation: A View From the Legislature, 73 MARQ. L.
REv. 535 (1990) (discussing the various issues that surfaced during the development of
the Kastenmeier legislation and how the subcommittee responded to them).
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1. The Federal Judiciary.-The Judicial Conference of the
United States has approached the increased aggregation of mass
torts with caution. When the 100th Congress first held hearings
on the Kastenmeier legislation, the Judicial Conference's support
was conditional. The Conference acknowledged the logic of expanding diversity jurisdiction to permit greater consolidation of
mass-tort cases in the federal system, because state courts often
cannot aggregate related cases to the extent that federal courts can.6
Still, because of the burden that the numerous diversity cases placed
on the federal courts, the Judicial Conference had long favored the
abolition of general diversity jurisdiction. Consequently, the Conference would not support any expansion of diversity jurisdiction
in the mass-tort context without corresponding restrictions on
general diversity jurisdiction.7
Even after the jurisdictional threshold for all diversity cases
was increased, the Judicial Conference's support for expanding
diversity jurisdiction in mass-tort cases stopped at mass accidents;
again, primarily out of concern for the courts' caseloads, the
Conference's support did not extend to other kinds of mass torts.!
Whether the Conference would agree to making minimal diversity
jurisdiction available in a broader range of mass-tort cases if
general diversity jurisdiction were further restricted, so as to be
available only in mass-tort cases, remains unclear. Even if diver6. CRAJ Act: Hearings,supra note 4, at 913 (staff analysis of action by the Judicial
Conference on Mar. 15, 1988).
7. See id. To avoid creating the misimpression that the Judicial Conference's sole
concern is the federal judiciary's workload, I should add that its interest in abolishing
diversity jurisdiction is further fueled by the firm belief that the raison d'etre for diversity
jurisdiction-state court bias against out-of-state litigants-is no longer the threat it was
when Congress created the jurisdiction in 1789. Prepared statement of the Hon. Charles
Clark, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference, before the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives 5-6 (March 21, 1991) (on file with THE REvraw
OF LITIoATION).

8. Multiparty, Multiforum JurisdictionAct of 1989: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice on H.R. 3406, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1989) [hereinafter Multiparty Act of 1989: Hearing] (statement of
U.S. District Judge William W. Schwarzer on behalf of the Judicial Conference). As
with the interest in abolishing diversity jurisdiction, the Judicial Conference's interest in
circumscribing the scope of the Kastenmeier bill is not limited to curbing its caseload,
but extends to concern for whether the average federal court could effectively manage
massive numbers of products-liability or toxic-exposure claims consolidated in a single
proceeding.
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sity jurisdiction is retained, the Conference might support
narrowly-targeted efforts to streamline the disposition of mass-tort
litigation such as asbestos cases-though not necessarily through
the minimal diversity mechanism contemplated by the Kastenmeier
bill. 9
The Judicial Conference, however, does not speak for all
federal judges. A number of judges believe that the federal courts
should take the mass-tort bull by the horns: some because they
think that the federal courts are better positioned than the state
courts to consolidate and resolve nationwide mass-tort cases," and
some simply because they do not share the Conference's opposition to diversity jurisdiction." These judges have supported the
Kastenmeier mass-accident legislation as far as it goes, but believe
that more ambitious legislation is needed to address the major
products-liability and toxic-exposure cases.' 2 Predictably, several
of these judges are deeply involved in adjudicating mass-tort cases.
2. The Federal Executive.-In response to a request from
Congressman Kastenmeier, Professor Daniel J. Meador, then an assistant attorney general in the Carter administration, developed the
first legislative proposal to facilitate the consolidation of mass-tort
cases by expanding diversity jurisdiction.' 3 The Meador proposal
would have applied to "any civil action arising out of a single event,
transaction, occurrence or course of conduct that results in personal
9. Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 2736 (March 1991) (on file with THe REviEw OF LITIGATION).
10. Multiparty Act of 1989: Hearing, supra note 8,at 317 (letter from U.S. District
Judge Jack B. Weinstein (E.D.N.Y.) to Congressman Kastenmeier, quoting the transcript
of Judge Weinstein's "Complex Disaster Litigation" speech delivered Oct. 19, 1988, at
Touro College School of Law (Nov. 9, 1988)).
11. See, e.g., Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee
Reports, v. I at 421 (July 1, 1990) (acknowledging the presence of some support for
diversity jurisdiction within the judiciary).
12. See, e.g., Multiparty Act of 1989: Hearing, supra note 8, at 283 (letter from U.S.
District Judge Jack Weinstein to Congressman Kastenmeier (Nov. 9, 1988)) (complimenting the Kastenmeier legislation as a "laudable step towards resolving some of the difficulties that arise in the context of complex disaster litigations," but criticizing the "rather
limited scope of jurisdiction").
13. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction/MagistratesReform-1979: HearingsBefore
the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 1046 and H.R. 2202, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
158-62 (1979) (Appendix A to letter from Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Meador
to Congressman Kastenmeier (June 25, 1979)).
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injury or injury to the property of twenty-five or more persons,"' 4
thus encompassing a wide range of mass torts.
When Congressman Kastenmeier introduced legislation adopting the Carter administration's approach, the Reagan Department
of Justice opposed its scope on the grounds that offering a federal
forum for general mass-tort litigation would overburden the federal
judiciary.' 5 The Department of Justice indicated that it would support the legislation only if its application were limited to mass accidents, and like the Judicial Conference, the Department further
conditioned its support upon additional restrictions being placed
upon general diversity jurisdiction.'6 In 1988, after those restrictions were included in the legislation, the Department went on
record as supporting the legislation, a position it reiterated in

1989.'

7

3. State Judges and State Legislators.-From the states'
perspective, the Kastenmeier legislation need not be viewed as
diminishing their sovereignty. Rather, the bill sought to facilitate
the federal consolidation of cases that could not be efficiently consolidated in the state courts because of constitutional limits on the
states' ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over all of the parties.
The intended effect, therefore, was not for the federal courts to
usurp a traditional state-court function, but for the federal courts to
accomplish what the state courts could not.'8
Nevertheless, some groups expressed concern that the bill
would impermissibly restrict the states' right to adjudicate cases
involving state law. The Conference of Chief Justices was one
such group. The Chief Justices have long supported the abolition
of diversity jurisdiction because they view adjudication of state14. Id.
15. CRAJ Act: Hearings, supra note 4, at 224 (testimony of Assistant Attorney
General Stephen J. Markman).
16. Id. at 224-29.
17. Multiparty Act of 1989: Hearing, supra note 8, at 28-32 (prepared statement of
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Stephen C. Bransdorfer). Two other changes requested by the Department of Justice were also made: one, clarifying the nature of the
injuries triggering the bill's jurisdiction and another, establishing a presumption in favor
of applying a single source of law to the entire action. See Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra
note 5, at 222.
18. H.R. REP. No. 515, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990).
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law disputes as the exclusive province of the state courts and, for
the same reason, oppose consolidation of mass-tort cases in the
federal courts.' 9 Another group-the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC)-has expressed similar concern over the
implications of the bill for state sovereignty."
This opposition, however, must not be overstated. The Conference of Chief Justices did not comment on the measure after it
was proposed by the Carter administration in 1979 or after it was
introduced in 1983 and 1986. Nor did the Conference oppose the
legislation in comments they submitted to the subcommittee after
the bill had been introduced for a third time in 1987." In fact,
the Conference of Chief Justices did not formulate its position until
1990,22 after the bill had passed the House. in two successive Congresses. In short, the Conference's extended delay in formulating
a position on the legislation calls into question the strength of its
opposition. ALEC, on the other hand, is a relatively small association of conservative state legislators with a membership of
2,300.3 The National Association of State Legislatures, which
represents all fifty state legislatures, and, indirectly, all 7,461 state
legislators, has taken no position on the bill.24
B. Private-Sector Participants
The most interesting participants in the mass-torts legislative
process have been the litigants and their lawyers.
19. Letter from Vincent L. McKusick, President, Conference of Chief Justices to
Congressman Kastenmeier (Sept. 5, 1990) (on file with THE REVIEW OF LrriTOON).
20. Multiparty Act of 1989: Hearing, supra note 8, at 246 (letter from Samuel
Brunelli, Executive Director, American Legislative Exchange Council, to Congressman
Henry Hyde (Nov. 22, 1989)).
21. CRAJ Act: Hearings, supra note 4, at 447 (letter from Robert W. Stephens,
Chairman, Committee on State-Federal Relations of the Conference of Chief Justices, to
Congressman Kastenmeier (Dec. 4, 1987)).
22. Letter from Vincent L. McKusick, supra note 19.
23. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS (24th ed. 1990). Although self-described as the
"nation's largest individual membership organization of state legislators," Multiparty Act
of 1989: Hearing,supra note 8, at 247 (letter from Samuel A. Brunelli, Executive Director, ALEC, to Congressman Henry J. Hyde (Nov. 22, 1989)), ALEC's numbers pale in
comparison to the National Association of State Legislatures, which represents the legislatures themselves, rather than their individual members.
24. Telephone conversation with Jonathan "Felde, General Counsel to the National
Association of State Legislatures (Apr. 8, 1991).
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1. Defendants.-The positions of the defense bar are the most
difficult to ascertain; four sources of information illuminate the
diverse range of its views.
(a) The American Bar Association Mass Torts Commission.-Before the Kastenmeier bill was introduced in October of
1989, the American Bar Association (ABA) Commission on Mass
Torts issued its preliminary report supporting comprehensive consolidation of mass-tort cases in the federal courts.' Although it
would be inaccurate to characterize the report as the work of the
defense bar, the Commission was chaired by a defense lawyer, and
of the eleven commissioners who joined in the report, five represented defendants and only one represented plaintiffs.26 This is not
to imply that the commissioners were anything less than public
spirited in their recommendations; rather, it simply suggests that
the five defense and corporate attorneys on the Commission would
be sensitive to the defendants' interests and would be unlikely to
support recommendations antithetical to those interests.
The chairman of the Mass Torts Commission submitted testimony to the subcommittee strongly supporting Congressman
Kastenmeier's mass-accident bill as a sound first step toward addressing the mass-tort problem.27 Other members of the Commission provided technical support, testified, and recommended
changes. Commissioner Barbara Wrubel, for example, testified
that the court to which all related litigation is transferred, rather
than the several courts in which the individual actions are first
filed, should be directed to assess punitive damages, so as to
eliminate the risk of multiple punitive-damages determinations.2"
Wrubel's suggestion was adopted by the House Judiciary Committee. 29
(b) The American Bar Association.-To date, the ABA
has made no official contribution, positive or negative, to the
25. Multiparty Act of 1989: Hearing, supra note 8, at 104 (American Bar Association
Commission on Mass Torts Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 1989)).
26. The remaining five were either judges or special masters. The biographies of
the Commissioners are included as Appendix B to the Commission's Report. Id. at 203.
27. Id. at 49 (summary of Statement of Robert W. Hanley (Nov. 15, 1989)).
28. Id. at 55 (statement of Barbara Wrubel on behalf of the ABA Commission on
Mass Torts).
29. H.R. REP. 515, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990).
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development of the Kastenmeier mass-tort legislation. At its 1990
mid-year meeting, the ABA withdrew a proposal to adopt the Mass
Tort Commission's report and rejected a resolution to support legislation similar to the Kastenmeier bill. The net effect is that the
ABA's position on the consolidation of mass torts is that it has no
position. °
(c) The Lawyers for Civil Justice.-The ABA's actions
at its 1990 mid-year meeting may be attributed, in part, to the
Lawyers for Civil Justice (LCJ), a trade association of defense
lawyers and corporate counsel. In testimony before the Courts Subcommittee, the LCJ offered two objections to the Kastenmeier bill:
(1) The bill's twenty-five victim threshold was so low that it would
flood the federal courts with mass-accident cases; and (2) a single,
federal choice-of-law standard would precipitate a race to the courthouse, allowing the winner to control the choice of law applicable
to all cases in the action.3
At the ABA mid-year meeting, the LCJ circulated letters,
white papers, and draft law review articles opposing the proposed
mass-tort resolutions. The white papers abandoned the two points
raised at the hearing in favor of five new objections: (1) The
legislation was unnecessary, (2) the legislation was unfair to plaintiffs, (3) the legislation was unfair to defendants, (4) the legislation
threatened state sovereignty, and (5) a3 single choice-of-law rule
would yield rigid and irrational results. 1
Of the seven cumulative points the LCJ raised before the Subcommittee and at the ABA convention, only one was uniquely
relevant to the trade association: The Kastenmeier bill was unfair
to defendants. Three reasons were offered: (1) Mass consolidation creates "inescapable pressure" to focus on common issues and
ignore the individual differences between cases, (2) "every consolidated proceeding would be a 'bet your company' case for
defendants," and (3) the pressure to settle would encourage plaintiffs with marginal claims to file against defendants.
30. Multiparty Act of 1989: Hearing, supra note 8, at 102 (letter from L. Stanley
Chauvin, President, American Bar Association, to Judge Joseph F. Weis (Feb. 20, 1990)).
31. Id. at 95-97 (statement of.James A. Dixon, Jr.).
32. Memorandum in Oppositiofi I (accompanying letter from James C. Rinaman, Jr.,
President, Lawyers for Civil Justice, to Members of the House of Delegates (Jan. 20,
1990)) (on file with THE REvIEw oi LrIGATION).
33. Id. at 3-5.
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Not one of these three concerns has any particular relevance
in the mass-accident context. In the average airplane-crash case,
what "individual differences" between passengers affect the airline's liability? None. How many airlines would be put out of
business by a single crash? None. How many more marginal
claims, over and above those generated under current law, will
consolidation of the average plane crash generate? None. Rather,
these are concerns that acquire relevance only in the context of
products-liability and toxic-exposure litigation.
Overall, LCJ's primary concern with the Kastenmeier legislation related not to the impact of the bill on mass-accident cases,
but to the bill's present and future implications for productsliability and toxic-exposure cases. These implications were twofold. First, the bill, as introduced in 1989, would have applied to
litigation arising out of a "single event or occurrence" that injured
at least twenty-five people.34 Arguably, the decision to design a
product in a particular way might be considered a "single event,"
and a continuous, long-term exposure to a toxic substance might
be labeled a "single occurrence."35 Because the Committee did not
intend such a result, it revised the bill to apply only to "single
accidents."36 With that clarification, the LCJ ceased its active opposition to the bill. Second, the mass-accident bill would have
put the camel's nose in the mass-tort tent. Once enacted, legislation consolidating mass-accident proceedings could serve as precedent for, and thereby facilitate, future legislative undertakings
seeking to consolidate other categories of mass-tort cases. Although the Committee could not legislatively preclude future Congresses from using the mass-accident bill in this way, in explaining
its decision to limit the bill's application to mass accidents, the
Committee report emphasized the widespread opposition to more
expansive consolidation.37
(d) Defendants Directly Affected by the Legislation.-In
contrast to the LCJ, prospective defendants in mais-accident cases,
such as the Boeing Corporation and the American Insurance
34. H.R. 3406, § 2, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
35. Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 5, at 224.
36. H.R. REP. No. 515, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1990).
37. Id. at 6-7.
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Association, supported the legislation38 for at least four reasons.
First, consolidation would reduce the transaction costs associated
with hiring lawyers to try duplicative lawsuits. Second, authorizing
the transferee court to resolve punitive-damages issues would
eliminate the risk that such punitive damages could be assessed
against the same defendant more than once. Third, a legislative
framework for the litigation of these cases would regularize the
process and make the ultimate outcome more predictable. Finally,
the federal forum would more adequately accommodate most suits
commonly involving plaintiffs and defendants from all over the
country, if not the world.
Perhaps the strongest conclusion that can be drawn about
defendants' position on the relative merits of increased consolidation is that it is likely to be situation specific. Whether the
benefits touted by mass-accident defendants will be perceived as
outweighing the costs underscored by the LCJ may vary from industry to industry, company to company, or product to product.
Consequently, the defense bar may continue to offer divergent
perspectives into the foreseeable future.
2. Plaintiffs.-A prospective plaintiff viewing the mass-torts
system from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance might well favor
legislation that promoted efficient and evenhanded compensation of
negligently injured victims, so as to ensure similar treatment of
similarly situated plaintiffs.39 Unlike defendants, however, plaintiffs are rarely repeat players in mass-tort actions and, therefore,
have no incentive to develop an institutional voice in the legislative
process.
This is not the case with the plaintiffs' bar. The President of
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) strenuously
opposed the recommendations of the ABA Commission on Mass
Torts." ATLA objected that the Commission had developed a
solution in search of a problem and that the proposed solution
38. Letter from Robert W. Kastenmeier to Senator Howell Heflin (Sept. 27, 1990)
(on file with THE REvIEW OF LITIGATION).
39. Perhaps for these reasons, the Public Citizen Litigation Group strongly supported
the bill. Multiparty Act of 1989: Hearing,supra note 8, at 279 (letter from Alan Morrison
to Charles Geyh (Nov. 14, 1989)).
40. Herman, Mass Tort Consolidation Plan Deeply Flawed, TRIAL, Dec. 1989, at 16.
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would handicap plaintiffs. "Unfortunately," concluded ATLA's
president, "the recommendations of the ABA Mass Torts Commission in general may shape a 'tort system' that will be just what
the drug companies, chemical companies, and toxic polluters or4
dered." 1
Without calling attention to ATLA's characterization of the
Commission's recommendations as pro-defendant, the LCJ noted
ATLA's opposition to the recommendations in materials it circulated at the ABA convention. 2 More specifically, the LCJ's white
papers offered a three-fold explanation for characterizing the
Commission's recommendations and the Kastenmeier massaccident bill as "unfair to plaintiffs": (1) increased consolidation
would cost plaintiffs their right to litigate in a local forum, (2)
with consolidation, "plaintiffs would lose control over their cases,"
and (3) consolidation would limit plaintiffs (or, more accurately,
their lawyers) to a single opportunity to establish their case.43
As with LCJ's reasons for why the resolutions were unfair to
defendants, the reasons for finding them detrimental to plaintiffs
make more sense in the context of products-liability and toxic-tort
litigation than in the context of mass-accident actions. First, given
the extent to which mass-accident litigation can be consolidated
under current law, plaintiffs cannot be assured of litigating in a
local forum. Second, while the products liability or toxic exposure
plaintiff understandably may complain about losing control of
litigation when its suit is consolidated with thousands of others,
the mass-accident plaintiff is unable to make as persuasive a case,
given that the number of claimants in mass-accident cases rarely
exceeds the hundreds. Finally, whatever the virtues of permitting
duplicative litigation where the factual and scientific issues are so
complex that several unfruitful efforts often precede the first successful suit, such issues are far less common in the mass-accident
context."
ATLA's position on the Kastenmeier legislation remains unclear. It declined invitations from the Courts Subcommittee in the
41.
42.
bers of
43.
44.

Id.
Letter from James C. Rinaman. Jr., President, Lawyers for Civil Justice, to Memthe House of Delegates (Jan. 20, 1990).
Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 32, at 5-6.
Kastenmeier & Geyh, supra note 5, at 232.
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House to comment on the legislation in the 100th and 101st Congresses,45 and did not submit a letter or other written statement to
the Courts Subcommittee in the Senate, although there are indications that ATLA representatives orally communicated certain reservations about the bill.46 Because ATLA was quick to criticize the
Report of the Mass Torts Commission, but offered no comparable
resistance to the Kastenmeier legislation, it may be that, as with
the LCJ, the implications of the bill for products-liability and
toxic-exposure cases give ATLA the greatest cause for concern.
C. Academic Participants
Academics are unique participants in the development of
court-reform legislation. First, although critics may question
whether academic thinking is colored by the desire for tenure,
notoriety, or consulting fees, scholars enter the court-reform
process unencumbered by the appearance of institutional bias. In
contrast, public- and private-sector participants are more vulnerable
to the accusation that their recommendations to improve the judicial system are driven, whether consciously or not, more by an
interest in improving their station within the judicial system than
by an interest in improving the judicial system itself.
Second, unlike the public- and private-sector participants, the
political significance of the scholar's viewpoint is limited. Nonacademic participants wield authority beyond the persuasive force
of their respective positions: the federal executive enjoys veto
power; the federal judiciary communicates the views of one
thousand judges to Congress in a single voice; and the organized
bar, in addition to speaking as one, speaks in a chorus hundredsof-thousands strong. In contrast, scholars speak only as individuals and, when taken together, produce a sound more often
cacophonous than harmonious. As a result, the scholar's viewpoint, apart from being that of a respected constituent to three
members of Congress, is limited to the intrinsic worth of the ideas
communicated.
45. CRAJ Act: Hearings, supra note 4, at 419. In 1989, ATLA submitted no statement in response to a letter inviting comments that was signed by the author on behalf
of the chairman (letter from Charles Geyh to Alan Parker (Oct. 10. 1989)).
46. The nature and extent of ATLA's communications with the Senate subcommittee
were ascertained through informal communications between the author and Senate staff.
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Academics, therefore, are uniquely situated to become trusted,
expert advisors, both on hotly contested issues where a more
detached view is desirable, as well as on complicated, technical
issues that might otherwise go unaddressed. Consequently,
scholars play a potentially critical role in the development of masstort proposals, which are among the most complicated and difficult
forms of court-reform legislation. In the 101st Congress alone,
Congressman Kastenmeier's subcommittee received invaluable insights and advice on the mass-accident bill from Professors
Stephen Burbank, Richard Freer, Mary Kay Kane, Francis McGovern, Arthur Miller, Linda Mullenix, Judith Resnik, Thomas
Rowe, Robert Sedler, Stephen Subrin, and Aaron Twerski.
Nevertheless, few scholars have embraced the mass-accident
bill as the optimal solution to the mass-tort problem; most have
harbored misgivings, either about any increased aggregation or,
conversely, about anything short of global aggregation of all mass
torts. 7 For all but the most ardent proponents of these disparate
views, 4" however, the Kastenmeier legislation represented an acceptable compromise: most critics of aggregation conceded the
utility of consolidated trials where all plaintiffs are injured in the
same place, at the same time, and in the same event, while most
advocates of complete aggregation accepted the Kastenmeier bill
as a good first step toward more ambitious initiatives in the future.
III. A Post-Mortem of H.R. 3406: Why Achieving Consensus and
Compromise May Be Necessary But Nonetheless Insufficient
Congressman Kastenmeier's preference for legislating in the
mass-torts area through consensus and compromise produced a bill
that attracted widespread support and no virulent opposition. The
47. Compare Sedler & Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass
Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 76 (1989) (concluding that
the objectives of increased consolidation sought by the ABA Mass Torts Commission and
the Kastenmeier bill "cannot be achieved in our federal system with its constitutional
constraints, without doing serious violence to long-standing principles of state sovereignty
and progressive trends in choice of law," id. at 76-77) and Mullenix, Complex Litigation
Reform and Article I1 Jurisdiction,59 FORDIAM L. Rev. 169 (1990) (concluding that the
Kastenmeier legislation "will not make a substantial contribution toward solving the procedural problems that the truly complex cases of the past decade have generated," and
given that most mass-accident cases are "handled efficiently" under existing law, "one
wonders why the Congress has bothered at all." id. at 195).
48. Such ardent proponents include the authors cited supra note 47.
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administration, the judiciary, and the defendants affected by the
legislation supported the bill. The defense bar discontinued its opposition after its primary concerns were addressed, and the
plaintiffs bar offered only belated and passive opposition to the
bill.
So why was no law enacted? H.R. 3406 passed the House
of Representatives on June 5, 1990, without objection.49 It was
then transmitted to the Senate, where it was referred to the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 0 which held no hearings on the bill.
Late in the Congress, virtually identical language was proposed for
inclusion in a judicial-improvements package positioned to move
through the Senate by unanimous consent." The Senate informally
circulated the proposed language to all its members to ascertain if
the requisite unanimity was present. Senator Howell Heflin, who
chaired the Senate Subcommittee with jurisdiction over the bill,
objected. In a letter to Congressman Kastenmeier, Senator Heflin
explained, "I simply wish to take a thorough review of this legislation before I can endorse it."53 The letter offered no insights
into what, if any, substantive concerns animated his interest in
scrutinizing the legislation more closely. Because Senator Heflin
would have blocked the unanimous consent package had the masstort provisions remained, the judicial-improvements legislation
went to the Senate floor without them.
In short, proceeding by consensus and compromise may be
pivotal to the success of mass-torts legislation in both the House
and Senate, but achieving consensus and compromise in legislation
passed by one body of Congress provides no guarantee that the
other body will process the legislation. Issues surrounding the
consolidation of mass torts present philosophical and technical
questions of enormous difficulty and staggering complexity. Thus,
the Senate, not having confronted these questions in a bill or hear49. 136 CONG. REc. H3116-3119 (daily ed. June 5, 1990).
50. 136 CONG. REc. S7716 (daily ed. June "11, 1990); see also Cong. Index (CCH),
House of Reps.,
35,063 (1989-1990).
51. Letter from Robert W. Kastenmeier to Senator Howell Heflin, supra note 38.
52. Senator Heflin is Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and
Administrative Practice, which had jurisdiction over the Kastenmeier bill.
53. Letter from Senator Howell Heflin to Robert W. Kastenmeier (Oct. 9, 1990) (on
file with THE REviEw OF LmIATIoN).
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ings of its own, might understandably be reluctant to sign off on
House-passed legislation. The real issue is why the Senate never
confronted these questions in a bill or hearing of its own.
Encouraging one house of Congress to act on a bill that the
other house has passed may not depend on consensus or compromise among interested parties. Rather, it may hinge on other
considerations ranging from the obvious to the obscure: (1)
Whether key legislators reviewing the bill passed by the other
body think that the legislation merits pursuit; (2) whether the time
remaining in the Congress after the first body passes the bill is
sufficient to permit action in the other body; (3) whether outside
supporters of the legislation communicate their views as actively
to the body that considers the measure second as they did to the
body that considered it first; (4) whether outside opponents of the
legislation communicate their views as passively to the body that
considers the measure second as they did to the body that considered it first; (5) whether the House and Senate maintain open
and effective channels of communication among the relevant members, committees, and their staffs; (6) whether companion committees in both houses of Congress consider separate pieces of
legislation initiated and passed by the other, giving each an added
incentive to process the other's work; and (7) a host of political,
personal, tactical, procedural, and substantive considerations that
may come into play in any given case.
In the case of the Kastenmeier legislation, time constraints appear to have caused the Senate's inaction. As Senator Heflin explained, 'This legislation arrived in my subcommittee during the
middle of this summer, and I simply have not had the time to
study the full effects of this legislation."'
He added, however,
that he wished to "put in writing [his] promise to thorough[ly]
review this legislation and conduct hearings at the start of the next
Congress."5
The next Congress, to which Senator Heflin referred, is now
upon us. Congressman William J. Hughes, Mr. Kastenmeier's
successor as Chair of the Court's Subcommittee (renamed the
Subcommittee on "Intellectual Property and Judicial Administra54.

Id.

55.

Id.
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tion"), has already reintroduced the legislation and held hearings
upon it. 6 Although Congressman Kastenmeier's bill did not become law in the 101st Congress, the experience with that legislation offers some insights to the problems and opportunities
awaiting legislative forays into the mass-torts arena in the 102d
Congress and beyond.

56.

H.R. 2450. A subcommittee hearing was held on June 19, 1991.

